Privacy-preserving crowdsourced site survey in WiFi fingerprint-based localization by unknown
Li et al. EURASIP Journal onWireless Communications and




survey in WiFi fingerprint-based localization
Shujun Li1*, Hong Li2 and Limin Sun2
Abstract
Typically, site survey is an inevitable phase for WiFi fingerprint-based localization which is regarded as one of the most
promising techniques for indoor localization. However, the site survey can cause potential location privacy leakage for
the participants who contribute their WiFi fingerprint measurements. In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving
site survey scheme for WiFi fingerprint-based localization. In the proposed scheme, we use homomorphic encryption
to protect the location privacy of the participants which get involved in the site survey. Further, we employ differential
privacy model to ensure that the released data will not breach an individual’s location privacy regardless of whether
she is present or absent in the site survey group. We theoretically analyze the security of the proposed scheme and
use simulation experiments on a real-world data to validate the efficiency of the proposed scheme.
Keywords: Privacy, Crowdsourcing, Site survey, Differential privacy
1 Introduction
Due to the increasing demand for location-based ser-
vices (LBSs) and the lack of GPS signals in indoor
environments, indoor localization has become more and
more popular in recent years. Researchers have pro-
posed a vast range of approaches, among which WiFi
fingerprint-based indoor localization is one of the most
promising technologies [1–4]. A typical WiFi fingerprint-
based localization algorithm consists of two phases,
offline site survey and online operating. In the offline
site survey phase, the service provider collects WiFi sig-
nal strengths from multiple access points (APs) at every
location of an interested area. Next, in the online oper-
ating phase, a to-be-localized client measures the signal
strengths at a specific location from nearby APs, and
then algorithms such as k-nearest neighbors [1, 3] or
probability-based algorithms [5] are employed to infer
the user’s location based on the measured WiFi signal
strengths.
Usually the site survey is conducted in a crowdsourced
way [2, 6, 7]. Suppliers recruited by the service provider
measure the WiFi signal strengths of nearby APs when
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they visit the places which the service provider is inter-
ested in, and then send themeasuredWiFi signal strengths
and the corresponding locations to the service provider.
The service provider aggregates the data contributed by
the suppliers to estimate the parameters which will be
used in the online operating phase. The parameters which
need to be estimated depend on the algorithms used in
the online operating phase. In k-nearest neighbor-based
algorithms, the mean of the WiFi signal strength of every
AP at every location needs to be estimated, while in the
probability-based algorithms, both the mean and vari-
ance of the signal strength of every AP are required.
Crowdsourcing is an efficient way to conduct the site
survey, but the measurements contributed by the sup-
pliers will inevitably leak their location privacy. The
service provider can infer the locations that the sup-
pliers visit based on the data they contribute. Existing
research indicates that location traces can leak informa-
tion about the individuals’ habits, interests, activities, and
relationships [8, 9]. Consequently, the loss of location
privacy can expose the suppliers to unwanted advertise-
ments and location-based spams/scams and may cause
social reputation or economic damage to the suppliers
and can make the victims of blackmails or even physical
violence.
Several approaches have been proposed to address the
privacy issues of indoor localization algorithms. In [10],
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Shu et al. studied the privacy issues in range-based local-
ization algorithms and proposed a scheme to protect
users’ privacy during the localization process. In [11],
Wang et al. developed a privacy-preserving fuzzy local-
ization scheme with CSI (Channel State Information)
fingerprint. These privacy-preserving schemes were not
designed for WiFi fingerprint-based localization algo-
rithms; thus, they cannot be used to address the privacy
issues presented in this paper. The most closely related
work to this paper is that of Li et al. [12] which pro-
posed a privacy-preserving scheme to address the privacy
issues of the online operating phase in WiFi fingerprint-
based localization algorithms . However, they did not
consider the privacy leaks of the offline site survey
phase.
In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving site
survey scheme which can protect the suppliers’ loca-
tion privacy in crowdsourcing-based site survey for WiFi
fingerprint-based localization and, at the same time, can
ensure the usability of the aggregated result for the
service provider. Under this scheme, all the suppliers
involved in the site survey form a group and they coop-
erate with each other to hide their measurements from
the service provider based on homomorphic encryp-
tion. Further, every supplier releases her measurements
in a differential private manner to guarantee that the
released data will not breach an individual’s location pri-
vacy regardless of whether she is present or absent in the
group. The contributions of this paper are summarized as
follows:
• To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to
address the privacy issues of the site survey in WiFi
fingerprint-based localization algorithms.
• We propose a privacy-preserving site survey scheme
for WiFi fingerprint-based localization based on
homomorphic encryption and differential privacy
model.
• We theoretically analyze the security of the proposed
scheme and carry out simulation experiments on a
real-world dataset to evaluate the performance of our
scheme.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first
discuss the related work and introduce the background.
Then, we present the detailed design of our scheme and
the security analysis. Finally, we report the evaluation
results and conclude this paper.
2 Related work
Location privacy in LBSs has been widely studied in the
literature. In general, all the existing works can be classi-
fied into two categories: privacy-preserving service request
and privacy-preserving localization.
2.1 Privacy-preserving service request
In LBSs, users send their locations to the service
provider to get the services, which will inevitably leak
their privacy. Many schemes have been proposed to
protect users’ location privacy when they request the
location-based services. k-anonymity [13, 14] provides a
form of plausible deniability by ensuring that the client
cannot be individually identified from a group of k
clients. Mix zone-based schemes [15] divide the whole
region into application and mix zones. Clients report
their locations in application zones and receive new,
unused pseudonyms at mix zones. Cryptography-based
approaches [16, 17] protect users’ location privacy based
on secure multiparty computation protocols. Since all
the above schemes focus on the privacy issues when
users request the location services, thus they cannot be
used to address the privacy issues we discuss in this
paper.
2.2 Privacy-preserving localization
To address the location privacy issues in localization,
Shu et al. [10] addressed the privacy leakage problem for
range-based localization algorithms, thus preventing the
leakage of the location information of both the target
and the anchors. Wang et al. [11] developed a privacy-
preserving fuzzy localization scheme with CSI finger-
print using homomorphic encryption and fuzzy logic.
These privacy-preserving schemes were not designed for
WiFi fingerprint-based localization; thus, they cannot
be used to address the privacy issues presented in this
paper. Li et al. [12] studied the privacy issues in WiFi
fingerprint-based localization and proposed a privacy-
preserving scheme to protect both the users’ and the ser-
vice provider’s privacy during the online operating phase.
However, they did not consider the privacy leaks during
the site survey phase.
3 Background
3.1 WiFi fingerprint-based localization
The process of WiFi fingerprint-based localization can
be divided into two phases: offline site survey phase and
online operating phase. In the offline site survey phase, a
supplier ui recruited by the service provider measures the
WiFi signal strengths Vis of nearby APs when they visit
a place ls and send (ls,Vis ) to the service provider which
aggregates the measurements and estimates the param-
eters which will be used in the online operating phase.
In the online operating phase, a to-be-localized user
measures the WiFi signal strengths at her current loca-
tion, denoted as V ′ =
(
v′1, v′2, . . . , v′j, . . . , v′N
)
. Then, the
service provider uses k-nearest neighbors or probability-
based algorithms to determine the location of the
user.
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In k-nearest neighbor-based algorithms [1, 3], the ser-
vice provider estimates the average WiFi signal strengths
Vs at every location ls based on the suppliers’ measure-
ments and stores (ls,Vs) in the WiFi fingerprint database.
In the online operating phase, k-nearest neighbors of V ′
are identified from the database to estimate the location
of the user. In probability-based algorithms [18, 19], the























A common assumption is that the signal strength of
APi at location l follows a normal distribution parame-
terized with mean μ and variance δ. The parameters μ
and δ are estimated by the service provider based on the
measurements of the suppliers.
3.2 Differential privacy
The concept of differential privacy is originally introduced
by Dwork [20]. Differential privacy ensures that a supplier
is not at increasing risk of privacy when she participates
in a certain statistical database. An algorithm A is -
differential privacy, if for any datasets D1 and D2, where
D1 and D2 differ in at most one record, and for all subsets
of possible answers S ⊆ Range(A),
Pr(A(D1) ∈ S) ≤ e · Pr(A(D2) ∈ S). (2)
The above equation indicates that the output of A
is insensitive to the modification of any single user’s
data in the datasets (including its removal or addi-
tion). The parameter  allows us to control the bal-
ance between the level of privacy and the data utility.
A smaller  implies stronger privacy. One common way
to achieve differential privacy is to add Laplace noises
to the original output of A according to the following
theorem.
Theorem 1. For all f : D → Rd, the following
mechanism A is -differential private: A(D) = f (D) +
L((f )/), where L((f )/) is an independently gener-
ated random variable following the Laplace distribution




∣∣f (D1) − f (D2)∣∣ (3)
for all D1 and D2 differing in at most one record.
3.3 The Paillier cryptosystem
In this work, we employ the Paillier cryptosystem as our
cryptographic primitive. Invented by Pascal Paillier [21],
the Paillier cryptosystem is a probabilistic asymmetric
algorithm based on the decisional composite residuosity
problem. Paillier cryptosystem is summarized below to
facilitate the understanding of our algorithm.
• Key generation: To construct the public and private
keys, one first chooses two large primes p, q of
equivalent length and computes N = pq,
λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1), g = N + 1, and μ = ϕ(N)−1
mod n, where ϕ(N) = (p− 1)(q− 1). The public key
PK and private key PR are (N , g) and (λ,μ),
respectively.
• Encryption: Let m be the plaintext to be encrypted.
We denote the ciphertext of m by E(m), which is
given by
E(m) = gmrN mod N2, (4)
where r ∈ ZN is a random number.
• Decryption: Let c be the ciphertext, the plaintext
D(m) is obtained by
D(m) = L(cλ mod N2)μ mod N . (5)
The Paillier cryptosystem is additively homomorphic.
Given only the public key, one can compute E(m1 + m2)
from E(m1) and E(m2) as follows:
E(m1+m2 mod N) = E(m1) ·E(m2) mod N2. (6)
4 Systemmodel and problem formulation
4.1 Systemmodel
A typical scenario of crowdsourcing-based site survey in
WiFi fingerprint-based localization is depicted in Fig. 1.
In general, there are n suppliers and an aggregator (i.e.,
the service provider). The suppliers could be volun-
teers or workers recruited by the service provider. Every
Supplier 1 




Fig. 1 System model of crowdsourcing-based site survey
Li et al. EURASIP Journal onWireless Communications and Networking  (2016) 2016:123 Page 4 of 9
supplier ui records the WiFi signal strengths Vsi =
(vs1i , vs2i , . . . , v
sj
i , . . .) when she visits location ls and stores
(ls,Vsi ) in her local database Vi, where v
sj
i is the measured
WiFi signal strength of the jth AP, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, ls ∈ L, and L
is a location set defined by the service provider. The aggre-
gator collects the measurements from the suppliers and
would like to estimate the mean and variance of the WiFi
signal strengths of every AP at every specific location in L
based on the measurements of the suppliers.
4.2 Design goal
In the crowdsourcing-based site survey, the aggregator
estimates the parameters based on the data (i.e., the mea-
sured WiFi signal strengths and the corresponding loca-
tions) contributed by the suppliers. However, the released
data inevitably leak the location privacy of the suppliers.
The aggregator can learn the locations that the suppliers
visit. The goal of this paper is to ensure that the aggre-
gator can estimate the mean and variance of WiFi signal
strengths of every AP at every location in L, and at the
same time, the location privacy of the suppliers is not
compromised. In detail, we want to achieve the following
privacy goals:
• Location privacy: Our scheme should ensure that the
aggregator cannot learn the locations that the
suppliers visited before. Also, the WiFi signal
strengths collected by the suppliers should not be
revealed, since the aggregator can infer their location
privacy based on their measured WiFi signal
strengths.
• Differential privacy: In the crowdsourcing-based site
survey, even though the measurements of every
supplier are completely hidden from the aggregator,
it still can infer the location privacy of a supplier ui by
comparing the aggregating result when the ui is in
the site survey group and that when ui is not in the
site survey group.1 Therefore, our scheme should
achieve differential privacy which has been accepted
as a standard for privacy preservation [20, 22].
Differential privacy can guarantee that the aggregator
can retrieve information about any supplier only up
to a predefined threshold, no matter what auxiliary
information it knows about that supplier.
In this paper, we adopt the “honest-but-curious” model
which assumes that each player honestly follows the des-
ignated protocols and procedures while it intends to
disclose the other’s private information.
5 Privacy-preserving site survey
In this section, we present a novel privacy-preserving
crowdsourcing-based site survey scheme which can esti-
mate the distribution of the WiFi signal strengths at each
specific location without leaking the privacy of each sup-
plier. The proposed scheme consists of four phases which
are detailed as follows.
5.1 Preparation and initiation
In this phase, n suppliers and an aggregator form a site sur-
vey group. Within this site survey group, every supplier ui
generates its public key PKi and private key PRi using the
Paillier cryptosystem and then sends the public key PKi to
other suppliers and the aggregator. The above process can
be executed offline and only needs to be performed once.
If the aggregator wants to estimate the mean and variance
of the WiFi signal strengths from the jth AP at location ls,
it sends a request with< APj, ls > to every supplier in this
group.
5.2 Adding noises
After receiving the aggregator’s request, every supplier ui
first queries its local dataset Vi to get a tuple (mi, vsji ),
wheremi indicates whether the supplier ui visited location
ls before and vsji is the measured WiFi signal strength of
the jth AP at location ls. If the supplier ui visited location
ls before, mi is set to 1 and vsji is set to the measured WiFi
signal strength. If the supplier ui never visited location ls
before,mi and vsji are both set to 0.
To ensure that the presence or absence of the sup-
plier ui in the site survey group will not significantly
increase her chance of being compromised (i.e., to
achieve -differential privacy), every supplier ui adds
appropriately chosen random noises to vsji and mi as
follows:
v′i = vsji + G1(n, λ1) − G2(n, λ1), (7)
m′i = mi + G3(n, λ2) − G4(n, λ2), (8)
where G1(n, λ1) and G2(n, λ1) are independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables having
gamma distribution with probability density function
(PDF)





and G3(n, λ2) and G4(n, λ2) are i.i.d. random variables
having gamma distribution with PDF





λ1 = f1/ and λ2 = f2/, where f1 and f2 are
the global sensitivity of the WiFi signal strength and m,
respectively. Since the WiFi signal strength ranges from
−90 to 0 dbm and m ∈ {0, 1}, we set f1 = 90 and f2 =
1. The parameter  controls the trade-off between the
desired privacy level and the data utility. A smaller  yields
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a stronger privacy guarantee but generates more noises.
In the evaluation section, we will investigate the impact
of  on the data utility. We will prove that the proposed
scheme can achieve -differential privacy in the next
section.
5.3 Encrypting data
After adding noises to her data, every supplier employs
secret sharing [23] and Paillier cryptosystem to hide her
data from the aggregator. For simplicity, we only demon-
strate how to hide v′i. The way to hide m′i is the same.
Each supplier ui first splits v′i into n random shares as
follows:
u1 : v′1 = v′11 + v′12 + . . . v′1i + . . . v′1n mod η
u2 : v′2 = v′21 + v′22 + . . . v′2i + . . . v′2n mod η
. . .
ui : v′i = v′i1 + v′i2 + . . . v′ii + . . . v′in mod η
. . .
un : v′n = v′n1 + v′n2 + . . . v′ni + . . . v′nn mod η,
(11)
where η is a large integer. Then, each supplier ui keeps
v′ii for herself, encrypts v′ij using the public key of
supplier uj, and then sends EPKj(v′ij) to the aggrega-
tor. After the aggregator receives the encrypted shares
from all the suppliers, she adds the shares which are
encrypted by the same public key based on the additively

































Then, the aggregator sends Vi to the supplier ui. Every
supplier ui decrypts Vi using her secret key PRi, and
adds her share v′ii to DPKi(Vi) to get V ′i =
∑n
j=1 v′ji
in plaintext and sends V ′i to the aggregator. Adding all
V ′i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) together, the aggregator can get V ′ =∑n
i=1 V ′i which is equal with
∑n
i=1 v′i. We will prove its
correctness in next section. In the same way, every sup-
plier can hide m′i from others, but the aggregator can get
M′ =∑ni=1m′i.
5.4 Estimating the parameters
After getting V ′ = ∑ni=1 v′i andM′ = ∑ni=1m′i, the aggre-
gator can estimate the mean (denoted as μ′) of the WiFi








Since every supplier adds controlled noises to her data,





i=1mi. The estimation error is controlled by
the parameter . We will investigate the impact of  on the
estimation errors and show that the localization accuracy
when we use μ′ is comparable with that when we use μ in
most cases.
To estimate the variance δ′, the aggregator send μ′ back
to every supplier ui which can then get δi as follows:
δi =
{
(vsji − μ′)2, ifmi = 1
0, ifmi = 0. (14)
Following the same rules described above, every sup-
plier ui adds a random noise G5(n, λ1) − G6(n, λ3) to δi
to get δ′i = δi + G5(n, λ1) − G6(n, λ3), and then sends δ′i
to the aggregator in a secret way. G5(n, λ1) and G6(n, λ3)
are i.i.d. random variables having gamma distribution with
PDF





where λ3 = 902/. Following the same rules above, the
aggregator computes
∑n
i=1 δ′i without knowing every δ′i ,
and the variance of the WiFi signal strengths of APt at
location ls can be estimated by δ′ =∑ni=1 δ′i/M′.
6 Theoretical analysis of the proposed scheme
In this section, we will theoretically analyze the correct-
ness of the proposed scheme and prove that the proposed
scheme can achieve the desired privacy goals.
6.1 The correctness of the scheme
In our scheme, we employ secret sharing and homomor-
phic encryption to protect the privacy of every supplier.
Every supplier ui splits her data v′i into n shares and sub-
mits V ′i to the aggregator. Adding all V ′i (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
together, the aggregator can get V ′ = ∑ni=1 V ′i . We claim
that V ′ =∑ni=1 V ′i is equal to∑ni=1 v′i, which is supported
by the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Only given V ′i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), the aggregator
can correctly compute
∑n
i=1 v′i by adding V ′i (1 ≤ i ≤ n)
together.
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Applying the additively homomorphic property of Pail-











































i=1 V ′i =
∑n
i=1 v′i, which proves
Theorem 2.
Following the same rules, we can also prove that the





Therefore, the correctness of the proposed scheme is
proved.
6.2 The security of the scheme
In the proposed scheme, every supplier adds random
noises having gamma distribution to achieve differential
privacy and further employs secret sharing to hide her
data. We claim that the proposed scheme can achieve the
desired privacy goals, which is supported by the following
two Theorems:
Theorem 3. The proposed scheme satisfies -differential
privacy.
Proof. In the proposed scheme, v′i = vi + G1(n, λ1) −
G2(n, λ1), where G1(n, λ1) and G2(n, λ1) are i.i.d. random
variables having gamma distribution with PDF


















(G1(n, λ1) − G2(n, λ1)) .
Let L(λ) denote a random variable which has a
Laplace distribution with PDF f (x, λ1) = 12λ1 e
|x|
λ1 .
According to [24], the distribution of L(λ1) is infinitely
divisible. Furthermore, for every integer n ≥ 1,
L(λ1) = ∑ni=1 [G1(n, λ1) − G2(n, λ1)], where G1(n, λ1)
and G2(n, λ1) are i.i.d. random variables having gamma
distribution with PDF g(x, n, λ1) = (1/λ1)1/n(1/n) x
1
n−1e−x/λ1 ,





























where L(λ2) and L(λ3) are two random variables fol-




λ2 and f (x, λ3) = 12λ3 e
|x|
λ3 , respectively. According to
Theorem 1, the proposed scheme achieves -differential
privacy.
Theorem 4. The proposed scheme can protect every
supplier’s location privacy.
Proof. In the proposed scheme, every supplier ui splits
its data v′i, m′i, and δ′i into n random shares and sends the
other encrypted n − 1 shares to the aggregator. Even the
aggregator gets the plaintexts of the other n − 1 shares, it
still cannot know v′i, m′i, and δ′i since ui keeps one share
after splitting the data. Therefore, the aggregator cannot
figure out whether ui visited ls and the measuredWiFi sig-
nal strength, which proves that the proposed scheme can
protect every supplier’s location privacy.
7 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the pro-
posed scheme. We focus on two important metrics in
the evaluation: the utility of the aggregated data and the
efficiency of the proposed scheme.
7.1 Experiment setup
We implement the supplier side of the proposed scheme
on a Android platform with a Qualcomm Snapdragon600
Quad-Core 1.7GHz CPU and 2G RAM, and the aggre-
gator side of the proposed scheme on a 32-bit computer
with Intel i7 CPU of 3.4GHz and 4Gmemory. The Paillier
modulus used in this work is set to 1024. In the exper-
iments, we use a real-world WiFi fingerprint dataset to
evaluate the performance of our algorithm. The dataset
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has total 1000 records which are collected in a typical
indoor environment. Each record contains the WiFi sig-
nal strengths from nearby APs. The total number of APs
used in the experiments is 10 (i.e., n = 10) and the total
number of locations in the indoor environment is 76 (i.e.,
|L| = 76). In the simulations, the data are randomly dis-
tributed to the suppliers and then the aggregator tries to
estimate the WiFi fingerprint at every location.
7.2 Utility evaluation
In the experiments, the aggregator estimates the WiFi
fingerprint at every location based on the data with
noises provided by the suppliers, and then uses the
estimated data to offer localization service. In this
section, we evaluate the impact of the added noises
on the aggregated results and the accuracy of the
localization.
In the proposed scheme, every supplier adds two
random noises with gamma distribution to her mea-
surements to achieve -differential privacy. In the
experiments, we employ the Euclidean distance as the
metric to evaluate the usability of the data with noises.
Figure 2 presents the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of the Euclidean distance between the estimated
WiFi fingerprint without noises and the estimated WiFi
fingerprint with noises. It is observed that the accuracy
of estimation increases when  increases from 0.4 to 2.0,
and 80% of the Euclidean distances between the noisy
WiFi fingerprint and the original WiFi fingerprint are
smaller than 6. A smaller  yields larger noises, which, on
the other hand, provides a stronger privacy preservation.
It is a trade-off between the utility of the data and the
privacy.
Further, we investigate the impact of our privacy-
preserving scheme on the localization accuracy. In this
paper, we employ k-nearest neighbors to determine the
unknown locations in the online operating phase. Figure 3
shows the CDF of the localization errors when  is set
to different values and when no noises are added to the
data. It is observed that the localization accuracy increases
Fig. 2 CDF of the Euclidean distances
Fig. 3 CDF of the localization errors
when  increases from 0.4 to 2.0 and the localization accu-
racy is the highest when no noises are added to the data.
We also observed that 80% of the localization errors are
within 5m, which implies a high data usability.
7.3 Computational and communication overhead
In this work, we employ Paillier cryptosystem as our
cryptographic primitive to protect the suppliers’ privacy,
which inevitably brings more computational and com-
munication overhead. In this section, we evaluate the
computational and communication cost of the proposed
scheme. In the experiments, we set  = 0.4 and investi-
gate the impact of the number of suppliers (i.e., n) on the
computational time and communication overhead.
Figure 4 shows the time cost on the supplier side and
the aggregator side for estimating theWiFi signal strength
of one AP at every location. We can see that the compu-
tational time on the supplier side is proportional to the
number of the suppliers. When the number of the suppli-
ers is set to 10, the time cost on the supplier side is 1.6 s.
When the number of the suppliers reaches 100, the time
cost on the supplier side is 16 s. The computational time
Fig. 4 The time cost of the suppliers and the aggregator
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Fig. 5 The bandwidth cost of the suppliers and the aggregator
on the aggregator side is proportional to the square of the
number of the suppliers. When the number of the suppli-
ers is 10, the computational time on the aggregator side
is only 0.08 s. However, when the number of the suppli-
ers reaches 100, the computational time on the aggregator
side becomes 8.8 s.
Figure 5 shows the impact of the number of the suppliers
on the bandwidth cost of every supplier and the aggrega-
tor. It is observed that the bandwidth cost of the supplier
is proportional to the number of the suppliers. The band-
width cost is 10 kb for every supplier when the number of
the supplier is 10. The bandwidth cost increases with the
increase of the number of the supplers. The bandwidth
cost reaches 101 kb for every supplier when the number
of the supplier is 100. The bandwidth cost on the aggre-
gator side is proportional to the square of the number of
the suppliers. When the number of the suppliers is 10,
the bandwidth cost of the aggregator is only 110 kb. When
the number of the suppliers is 100, the bandwidth cost
becomes 10100 kb.
8 Conclusions
In this work, we propose a privacy-preserving site sur-
vey scheme for WiFi fingerprint-based localization. The
proposed scheme uses homomorphic encryption and dif-
ferential privacy model to protect the location privacy of
the participants which get involved in the site survey pro-
cess of the WiFi fingerprint localization. We theoretically
analyze the security of the scheme and use simulation
experiments on real-world data to validate the efficiency
of the proposed scheme.
Endnote
1 For example, assume that the mean of the WiFi signal
strengths estimated by the aggregator is μ1 when ui is in
the group, and the mean of the WiFi signal strengths is
μ2 when ui is not in the group. The aggregagor can get
the measured WiFi signal strength of ui by the formula
μ1 · n − μ2 · (n − 1), where n is the number of suppliers
in the group.
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